

An Introduction Competition Order 2015

Towards a more efficient market and sustainable growth

Competition and Consumer Affairs Department Executive Secretariat to the Competition Commission Brunei Darussalam




- Competition Order 2015 exists to provide businesses with equal opportunities to participate fairly in the national economy
- Competitive markets will increase the size of the pie and generate more wealth and consumer welfare
- The role of attracting consumers as to the different qualities, prices and characteristics between different categories of goods and services lays with the firms competing on the market
- Consumers have the right to go to any supplier who offers goods and services



A law that prohibits business practices which restrict a fair competition process in a market.

Objectives





Key Prohibitions



Section 11



Anti Competitive Agreement (Cartels) **Section 21**



Abuse of Dominant Position

Section 23



Anti-Competitive Mergers

1 Jan 2020

Will be enforced at a later stage

1st Prohibition: Anti-Competitive Agreements (Cartels)





- Agree to act together instead of competing
- Agreements are designed to reduce competition to drive up profits

The 4 Don'ts:

- 1) Price Fixing
- 2) Bid Rigging
- 3) Market Sharing
- 4) Limiting supply



Price Fixing

- Agreeing to fix or maintain price (verbal or written agreement)
- **Keep prices high** compared to a competitive market
- Sharing market information like pricing, profit, through associations / informal discussions



- Information exchange via trade associations is common;
- Certain information sharing harms the competitive process;
- Commercially sensitive information includes:
 - information on price (future price);
 - customers, costs and quantities;
 - market strategies of competitors.

Sector: Confectionary and Bakery

Country: Malaysia

Companies: 24 members of the Sibu Confectionery and Bakery Association (the 'SCBA')

Case story:

- The 24 competing companies were found to agree to increase prices of products by 10-15% in Sibu area.
- This narrows and eliminates competition in market.
- This agreement gives the parties opportunity to impose higher prices to maximize profitability without any competition.

Penalty: RM\$439,000 (approx. BND\$145,522)



Bid Rigging



- Any agreement (written or oral) between bidders that limits or reduces competition in a tender
- Bidders agree amongst themselves who should win the tender and at what price

Sector: Electrical services

Product: Electrical Services for Formula 1 in Singapore


Companies: Cyclect Group, HPH Engineering and Peak Top Engineering


Type(s) of bid rigging: Complementary Bidding

Case story: CCS's investigation revealed that the Cyclect Group prepared and submitted relatively higher prices for HPH's and Peak Top's bids than its own "winning" bids.

The bid prices were about 25 to 30 per cent higher than Cyclect Electrical's. Cyclect Group had previously subcontract to HPH and has a personal relationship with Peak Top's director.

Penalty: All 3 parties were fined. Cyclect Group was fined S\$559,297, HPH was fined S\$28,128 and Peak Top, S\$21,693.





Sector: Fresh Chicken

Country: Singapore

Companies: Gold Chic Poultry Supply and its related firm; Hua Kun Food Industry; Hy-fresh Industries; Kee Song Food Corporation; Ng Ai Food Industries; Sinmah Poultry Processing; Toh Thye San Farm; & Lee Say Group and Tong Huat Group (affiliated companies)

Case story:

- Competition Commission Singapore (CCS) found that the 13 chicken distributors have agreed to increase price (\$0.10 - \$0.30 per kg)
- Also agreed not compete for each other's customers in the market of supply of fresh chicken products in Singapore.
- Customers had "limited option" to switch to more competitive companies

Penalty: BND\$26.8 million



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- Agreeing to limit the quantity of goods or services
- Keep prices high by limiting supply of goods (artificial shortage)

Supply Control

Key Prohibitions



Section 11 Section 21 Section 23 UBER Grak **Abuse of Dominant Anti-Competitive Anti Competitive Agreement (Cartels) Position** Mergers Will be enforced at a later stage 1 Jan 2020

2nd Prohibition: Abuse of Dominant Position



- Nothing wrong being dominant; nothing abusive being profitable
- Abusive conducts:
 - Predatory pricing
 - Refusal to supply/limiting production to the prejudice of consumers

Two-step test:

- Whether a company is dominant in a relevant market (substitutability test); and
- Whether it abuses its dominance

Needs economic-based assessment to determine whether the act has, or likely to have, an adverse effect to competition.



Section 21

Key Prohibitions



Section 11



Anti Competitive Agreement (Cartels) Section 21



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
Anti-Competitive Mergers

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3rd Prohibition: Anti-Competitive Merger






Mergers are prohibited ONLY if the merged entity **lessen or restrict competition in the market**

Any anticipated mergers or mergers to be notified to the Commission for consideration and decision

Section 23





Transitional period

Time frame to allow businesses to make adjustment ONLY for agreements made before 1 June 2019



All commercial entities across sectors

S Government and Statutory Body functions and those acting on behalf of Government and Statutory Body

Exemption and Exclusion



Block Exemption

The Commission may recommend to the Minister to issue block exemption to certain sector upon assessment of net economic benefit and public interest


Exclusion

- Applicable to Section 11- Anti-Competitive Agreement
- Activities specified in Third Schedule:
 - Services of general economic interest
 - Compliance with legal requirements
 - o Vertical arrangement
 - Avoidance of conflict with international obligations
 - \circ Public Policy
 - Agreements with net economic benefit
 - Goods and Services regulated by other competition law

Section 15 & Third Schedule

Institutional Framework





Functions of Commission



Advocacy

- Raising Awareness
 Competition culture
- Voluntary compliance
- Policy advisory






Power to Conduct Market Review

- Examine competition issues in the market
- Review if the market is functioning well
- Explore causes of insufficient competition







Section 31, 35, 42 & 45

Leniency Regime



- For businesses to disclose anticompetitive conducts that they had been involved with.
- Businesses may be granted up to full immunity from any penalties in exchange to information disclosure and cooperation.



Section 44

Key Takeaways

 Companies should take their business decisions independently of their competitors

- Arrangement with competitors that restrict competition are illegal
- Your compliance will build business growth, reputation and a healthy business environment







Executive Secretariat to the Competition Commission Brunei Darussalam

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